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In the classic 1947 movie “Miracle on 34th Street,”1 Macy’s 
Department Store’s Santa Claus claims to be the real Kris Kringle and is 
committed to Bellevue Mental Hospital.  Kringle challenges his 
commitment in court at a formal hearing, in which Kringle’s lawyer 
argues that Kringle is sane because he really is Santa Claus.  There is a 
scene that illustrates the classic conflict in ideology as to how, in reality, 
our judges are selected.  In the movie, the trial judge wants to expedite 
the hearing, finding the claim by “Kris Kringle” ridiculous.  However, 
his political advisor2 warns him of the consequences of ruling that there 
is no Santa Claus because the judge is up for re-election.3
 
*Dean and Randolph Baxter Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  B.A. Temple 
University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law; Dip. Crim., Cambridge University. 
  For those 
favoring election of judges, this is democracy in action.  A judge’s 
perhaps precipitous action is tempered by his recognition that the voters 
 1. MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1947). 
 2. The political advisor, Charlie Halloran, is played by William Frawley.  Some of you are 
old enough to remember that Mr. Frawley played Fred Mertz on “I Love Lucy.” 
 3. For those of you who have forgotten the story, when the post office delivers sacks and 
sacks of letters addressed to Santa Clause to the individual who calls himself “Mr. Kringle,” sitting 
in the courtroom, the judge rules that if the government of the United States believes him to be the 
real St. Nick, who is he to argue! 
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who observe his behavior will determine his future career.  For those 
opposing election of judges, this is the worst kind of political influence.  
A party hack, called a political advisor, tells a judge how he should rule. 
 
I. CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO. 
 
Moving up to the early 21st century, a recent case, which was the 
basis for a John Grisham novel,4 also illustrates the impact of and debate 
over the method of selection of judges.  A.T. Massey Coal Company 
was sued by Hugh Caperton for interfering in his contractual relationship 
with a third company.5  Caperton won a $50 million verdict.6
Don Blankenship, the Chairman, CEO and President of Massey 
Coal Company
 
7 was obviously concerned that the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals might uphold the $50 million jury verdict.  
However, his case would not be decided until after the next election and 
one of the sitting Justices, Warren McGraw, who was most likely to vote 
against him, was up for re-election.8
Both directly and indirectly, Blankenship donated more than $2.5 
million to the Benjamin campaign and also paid out $500,000 in 
independent expenditures and direct mailings to support Benjamin.
  Blankenship had counted the votes.  
If he could get one more State Supreme Court Justice on his side, he 
would win his appeal.  In other words, if Blankenship could oust 
McGraw and replace him with his opponent, Brent Benjamin, and let 
Benjamin know that Blankenship’s support led to his election, 
Blankenship could win the appeal. 
9
To provide some perspective, Blankenship’s $3 million in 
contributions were more than the total amount spent by all the other 
Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s 
own committee.  Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million 
more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both 
candidates combined.
  As 
stated by the United States Supreme Court: 
10
 
 4. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008); Joan Biskupic, “Supreme Court case with the 
feel of a best seller”,, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-court_N.htm. 
 
 5. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 329-32 (W.Va. 2009), rev’d, 129 S. 
Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
 6. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256 (2009). 
 7. See id. at 2257.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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When the case finally came before the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, Caperton asked Benjamin to recuse himself.11  
However, Benjamin refused and then cast his vote to make the three to 
two majority that reversed the jury’s verdict against Massey (and 
Blankenship).12  Caperton first sought reconsideration from the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,13 and when that was denied, sought 
and received a grant of certiorari from the United States Supreme 
Court.14  The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision below 
in a five to four decision, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company,15 
stating that the due process clause mandated recusal in this case where 
there was a serious risk of bias, as indicated by the large campaign 
contributions involved and the “temporal relationship between the 
campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the pendency of the 
case.”16  No proof of actual bias was needed.17
Massey argued against overturning the West Virginia Supreme 
Court’s decision and the denial of the recusal request by stating that “in 
the end the people of West Virginia elected [Benjamin].”
 
18  
Blankenship’s contributions were just one factor, among others, that 
contributed to his success.19  Massey and others also warned that to 
overturn the West Virginia court might lead to “unnecessary interference 
with judicial elections.”20  But, the Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy, 
held that this was an extraordinary case and “application of the 
constitutional standard in this case [that the potential for bias was a 
violation of the due process clause] will thus be confined to rare 
instances.”21
 
 11. Id. 
 
 12. Id. at 2258. 
 13. After the request for a rehearing, two of the five justices were disqualified.  One of the 
justices who voted for the coal company had been photographed vacationing with Blankenship in 
the French Riviera when the case was pending.  A justice who voted for Caperton recused himself, 
at the request of Blankenship, because of his public criticism of Blankenship’s role in the judicial 
election.  Benjamin refused to disqualify himself and then, as acting Chief Justice, picked the two 
replacements.  A divided court then voted again, 3 to 2, to reverse the jury verdict. Caperton, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2258-59. 
 14. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008). 
 15. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252. 
 16. Id. at 2264. 
 17. Id. at 2263 (“[O]bjective standards may also require recusal whether or not actual bias 
exists or can be proved.”). 
 18. Id. at 2264. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 2265. 
 21. Id. at 2267. 
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Again, the debate over this case focused on the interaction of 
democratic principles and judicial independence.  For those supporting 
the popular election of judges, Caperton is the exception that proves the 
rule.  It is the “extreme and rare” case that requires action.  As detailed 
by Justice Scalia for the Supreme Court in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White,22 voters have a right to know what judicial 
candidates’ views are in order to determine if they should vote for that 
candidate, and interest groups have a right to know a judicial candidate’s 
views in order to determine if they should support or oppose a 
candidate.23  Such support is not only appropriate, but is the core of the 
democratic principle of “representative government.”24  Impartiality, 
which under one definition means “lack of preconception in favor or 
against a particular legal view[,] . . . is not a compelling state interest” 
justifying restrictions on a judicial candidate’s election speech.25
“‘[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our 
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms . . . .’”
 
26  The 
“complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of 
‘representative government’” is not a true picture of the American 
system.  “Not only do state court judges possess the power to ‘make’ 
common law [like a legislator], but they have the immense power to 
shape the States’ constitutions as well.”27
For those opposing the election of judges, Caperton is an excellent 
example of the inherent problem of forcing judges to run for office and 
the necessity for them to secure campaign contributions to do so.  Such 
contributions will have an impact and, in some cases, a determining 
impact on the elected judge’s decision-making.
 
28
 
  As described by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White: 
[T]he very practice of electing judges undermines [the government’s 
interest in an impartial judiciary]. . . . [I]f judges are subject to regular 
elections, they are likely to feel they have at least some personal stake 
in the outcome of every publicized case. Elected judges cannot help 
 
 22. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  
 23. Id. at 782, 788. 
 24. Id. at 784. 
 25. Id. at 777 (emphasis in original). 
 26. Id. at 781 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 
222-23 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. at 784.   
 28. See Genelle I. Belmas & Jason Shepard, Speaking from the Bench: Judicial Campaigns, 
Judges’ Speech and the First Amendment, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 711 (2010). 
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being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a 
particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects. . . . Moreover, 
contested elections generally entail campaigning.  And campaigning 
for a judicial post today can require substantial funds [and thus]. . . 
fundraising.  Yet relying on campaign donations may leave judges 
feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.29
II.  IOWA AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
The most recent example of the conflict between those supporting 
elections of judges and those who believe elections compromise judicial 
independence occurred in Iowa in the 2010 election.  On April 3, 2009, a 
unanimous seven justice Iowa Supreme Court held that denying same-
sex couples the right to marry was a violation of various liberty and 
equality rights, which could be summarized in the doctrine of equal 
protection, protected by the Iowa Constitution.30
In 2010, three of the justices came before the voters in a judicial 
retention election.
 
31  A push to oust these justices was made by a series 
of citizens’ groups.  The push was led by the Washington-based National 
Organization for Marriage and by Iowans for Freedom, an organization 
started and directed by Robert Vander Plaats, the former Republican 
gubernatorial candidate and Sioux City businessman.32  Although all 
campaign reports are not in yet, over $1 million was spent to defeat these 
justices.33  The Iowan Justices involved chose not to counter the 
campaign, but their supporters urged their retention, based on the 
concept of merit selection and an independent judiciary.34
 
 29. 536 U.S. at 788-90 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
 30. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 31. They were Justices David Baker, Michael Streit, and Marsha Ternus.  Krissah Thompson, 
Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Iowa Judges, Politicizing Rulings on Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 
2010. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Memorandum from Rachel Paine Caufield, AJS Hunter Center for Judicial Selection to 
AJS Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 3, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Caufield Memo].  AJS is the 
American Judicature Society.  I serve as Chair of the National Advisory Commission for AJS and 
am a member of the AJS Board of Directors.  AJS states that its mission “is to secure and promote 
an independent and qualified judiciary and a fair system of justice.”  See 94 Judicature, Sept.-Oct., 
2010, Inside Cover. 
 34. See Caufield Memo, supra note 33; Editorial, In Too Many States, Judges Face Reprisals 
for Unpopular Rulings, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 2010, at 8A [hereinafter Too Many States]; 
Thompson, supra note 31. 
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On Tuesday, November 2, 2010, all three Iowa Supreme Court 
Justices were voted out of office, with approximately 54% of the voters 
rejecting their bids for retention.35
Supporters of this ouster argue that this was a victory for the 
people.  “Judges derive their power from the people [and] . . . the voters 
of Iowa have the civil right, and duty, to hold the judges accountable.”
 
36  
This decision will “send a message across the country that the power 
resides with the people.”37
Opponents of the ouster see this vote as a threat to judicial 
independence.  Here, judges “did their jobs.  They read the state 
constitution without regard to politics, public opinion, or the passions of 
the moment.”  It would be hard to overstate the importance of the 
principle of judicial independence.  Few scenes in American history are 
uglier than those written when public opinion, sometimes vicious, has 
ruled the courts.
 
38
Courts have historically been “protector[s] of minority rights [and 
the decision] ‘really might cause judges in the future to be less willing to 
protect minorities out of fear that they might be voted out of office.’”
 
39
So, this is the conflict and it goes to some fundamental values in 
American society.  Do we want all decisions to be decided by a 
majority?  Or do we want the safeguard of an impartial and independent 
judiciary system?  
 
III.  WHAT IS “JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE” AND IS IT IMPORTANT? 
In Justice Stevens’ dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, he distinguished the work of a judge from other political officials: 
In a democracy, issues of policy are properly decided by majority vote; 
it is the business of legislators and executives to be popular.  But in 
litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular 
vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity. . . . 
 
 35. Caufield Memo, supra note 33; Editorial, Election Takeaways, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 
2010, at 8A. 
 36. Brian S. Brown, Opposing View On Judicial Independence: Hold Judges Accountable, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010, at 8A. 
 37. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2010, at A1 (quoting Robert Vander Plaats). 
 38. Editorial, Election Takeaways: From Iowa, a Chilling Message to Judges, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 5, 2010, at 8A.  The Editorial made an interesting analogy:   “At his confirmation hearing, 
U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts famously compared the role of a judge to that of an umpire calling 
balls and strikes.  Imagine what would happen to the integrity of baseball if umpires were hounded 
from the field for making calls the home crowd didn’t like.”  Id. 
 39. Sulzberger, supra note 37 (quoting U.C. Irvine Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky).  
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Consistent with that fundamental attribute of the office, countless 
judges in countless cases routinely make rulings that are unpopular and 
surely disliked by at least 50 percent of the litigants who appear before 
them.  It is equally common for them to enforce rules that they think 
unwise, or that are contrary to their personal predilections. . . . [A 
judge] has a duty to uphold the law and to follow the dictates of the 
Constitution.  If he is not a judge on the highest court in the State, he 
has an obligation to follow the precedent of that court, not his personal 
views or public opinion polls. . . . [He or she is to decide] on the merits 
of individual cases, not as a mandate from the voters. . . . [T]he judicial 
reputation for impartiality and open-mindedness is compromised by 
electioneering that emphasizes the candidate's personal predilections 
rather than his qualifications for judicial office.40
Justice Ginsburg, citing a number of Supreme Court decisions, goes 
even further:  “The guarantee of an independent, impartial judiciary 
enables society to ‘withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts.’”
 
41  “‘Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or 
privileges would amount to nothing.’”42
IV.  THE “TRIPLE WHAMMY” THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
In addition to Iowa, various interest groups launched ouster 
campaigns in Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Illinois and Florida.43
 
 40. 536 U.S. 765, 798-802 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
  They all 
 41. Id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 42. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).  She explains: 
  Whether state or federal, elected or appointed, judges perform a function 
fundamentally different from that of the people’s elected representatives.  Legislative 
and executive officials act on behalf of the voters who placed them in office; “judge[s] 
represent[t] the Law.”  Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are 
expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies or committing themselves 
on controversial issues in advance of adversarial presentation.  Their mission is to decide 
“individual cases and controversies” on individual records, neutrally applying legal 
principles, and, when necessary, “standing up to what is generally supreme in a 
democracy:  the popular will.”  
  A judiciary capable of performing this function, owing fidelity to no person or party, 
is a "longstanding Anglo-American tradition,” an essential bulwark of constitutional 
government, a constant guardian of the rule of law. 
Id. at 803-04 (internal citations omitted). 
 43. Sulzberger, supra note 37.   
BELSKY_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:49 PM 
154 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY [2:147 
failed.44  Still, more was spent on retention elections in 2010 than was 
spent in the previous decade.45  In addition, increasing amounts are 
being spent on regular elections of judges, often on an ideological and 
partisan basis.46  While there have been numerous cases in the past thirty 
years where the popular election of judges, either directly or through 
retention votes, has led to pitched and often ideological battles,47
V.  SECURING THE POSITION OF CANDIDATES 
 a series 
of United States Supreme Court decisions in the past decade have made 
the judicial election process even more ideological and issue based. 
First, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a five to four 
decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the United States Supreme 
Court held that any restrictions placed on judges running for re-election 
or retention and judicial candidates “from announcing their views on 
disputed legal and political issues” is in violation of the First 
Amendment.48  Thus, an interested party (and potential or actual large 
contributor) can demand that a judge or a judicial candidate announce 
his or her views on an issue of great import to the contributor as a 
condition precedent to a gift.  The judge or candidate can no longer rely 
on state statutes or judicial canons as a basis to refuse this request.49
VI.  FUNDING FAVORED CANDIDATES 
 
Next, as early as 1976, the United States Supreme Court in Buckley 
v. Valeo stated that there can be no limitations on independent campaign 
spending by individuals and groups, corporations, and unions in any 
election, including judicial elections.  While limits can be placed on the 
amount that can be contributed directly to a candidate, restrictions on 
independent expenditures violate that entity’s free speech rights.50
 
 44. Id. 
  In 
2003, however, the Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 
 45. Id. (citing the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School).  Thirty-
eight states select justices to their highest courts through popular elections.  Seventeen of these use 
“merit selection and retention” systems.  Justices in twenty-one states are picked in contested 
elections. Kenneth Jost, CQ Press, Judicial Elections: Are Races for Judgeships Bad for Justice?, 
19 CQ Researcher 373, 376 (2009) [hereinafter Judicial Elections]. 
 46. See Jost, Judicial Elections, supra note 45, at 375-76. 
 47. Id. at 382. 
 48. 536 U.S. 765, 768, 788 (2002). 
 49. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1972); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5(a)(3)(d)(i) (2000).  Justice Scalia specifically referenced these two Canons in 
Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 768. 
 50. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).   
BELSKY_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:49 PM 
2011] ELECTING OUR JUDGES 155 
held that a federal statute could not only prohibit corporations and 
unions from direct contributions to a candidate but could also bar 
“electioneering communication," or “speech expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of a [specific] candidate.”51  Corporations were free, 
under federal law, to use independent expenditures to engage in political 
speech, so long as that speech did not expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate.52  In addition, 
independent committees and political action committees (PACs), could 
collect funds and make independent expenditures on behalf of 
candidates.53
In 2009, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Court, in a five to four opinion by Justice Kennedy, reconsidered and 
overruled even the limited restrictions placed on corporations and unions 
in McConnell.
 
54  The Court reasoned that, “[t]he First Amendment does 
not permit Congress to make . . . categorical distinctions based on the 
corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political 
speech.”55
The results of this series of decisions have been a dramatic growth 
in the amount of campaign expenditures by independent groups 
advocating particular issues or positions that will come before state 
courts.  From 1990 to 2009, candidates in state high court races raised 
$207 million, as compared to $83.3 million in the previous decade.
 
56  
The largest contributors were the business groups, trial lawyers groups, 
unions, and, of course, political parties.57  Many of the contributors, who 
must disclose their identities in these ads, use names that hide their true 
identity.  For example, the “Partnership for Ohio’s Future” is funded by 
the U.S. and Ohio Chamber; “Texans for Public Justice” was funded by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers; and the “Center for Individual Freedom” was funded 
by large tobacco companies.58  Issue-based ads, especially television 
commercials funded by these interest groups,59
 
 51. 540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003). 
 not only impact elections 
 52. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).  
 53. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003). 
 54. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009). 
 55. Id. at 913. 
 56. James Sample, Adam Skaggs, Jonathan Blitzer, & Linda Casey, THE NEW POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2000-2009:  A DECADE OF CHANGE, at 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_new_politics_of_judicial_elections/. 
[hereinafter THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010]. 
 57. Id. at 13-15. 
 58. Id. at 42-54. 
 59. See Editorial, Judges and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at A18. 
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but also “corrode public confidence in the judicial system.”60  A 2009 
USA Today Gallup poll “found that 89 percent of those surveyed 
believed that campaign contributions were problematic and could 
influence a judge’s rulings.”61
VII.  RECUSAL OR DISQUALIFICATION 
 
Supporters of the election of judges argue that even if potential 
contributors can demand that recipients indicate their position on issues 
and even if there can then be unlimited campaign contributions based on 
these announced positions, this does not necessarily mean that such 
individuals cannot and will not be “independent” in individual cases.  As 
Justice Scalia argued in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
impartiality is not the same as independence.62  Having an opinion as to 
the issues involved in a case does not necessarily show a bias towards a 
party in the proceeding.63
A judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a 
case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, 
and with good reason.  For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a 
judge who does not have preconceptions about the law. . . . Indeed, 
even if it were possible to select judges who did not have preconceived 
views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so.  “Proof 
that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete 
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be 
evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”
 
64
Having an opinion is not the same as not being open-minded, 
continues Justice Scalia:  
 
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on 
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his 
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise 
in a pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each 
litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at 
 
 60. Sample et al., THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010, supra note 56, at 22 (quoting Governor and 
former District Attorney Edward Rendell of Pennsylvania). 
 61. Editorial, Judges for Sale, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2010, at A12 [hereinafter Judges for 
Sale]. 
 62. 536 U.S. 765, 775-79 (2002). 
 63. Id. at 777-78. 
 64. Id. 
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least some chance of doing so.   Statements of opinion are not 
“promises” to vote a particular way.65
We must trust our judges.
 
66 Elected judges “always face the 
pressure of an electorate who might disagree with their rulings and 
therefore vote them off the bench.”67  But, this has not stopped judges 
from ruling against the majorities’ wishes.68
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy states in his concurrence in 
Republican Party of Minnesota, States can adopt strict recusal standards 
to assure judicial independence.
 
69  Recusal is an adequate remedy for 
problems associated with campaign contributions and free speech 
protections for contributors and judges.70
The Caperton decision would seem to support Justice Kennedy’s 
concept that recusal is a significant remedy for any negative impacts 
from the process of electing judges.  But, in fact, Caperton stands for the 
opposite position.  The case does set some outside limits on how far 
present law will allow a particular judge to participate in a case where 
there is a showing of issue based campaign contributions and explicit 
statements (and perhaps even quiet, secret commitments) on specific 
issues.  But, the case itself indicates how weak those limitations are. 
 
In Caperton, four dissenting Justices argue that explicit conflicts 
are necessary in order to mandate disqualification or recusal—a financial 
interest in the outcome or criminal contempt prosecutions where the 
contempt was against the judge.71  “Vaguer notions of bias or the 
appearance of bias were never a basis for disqualification . . . . All 
judges take an oath to . . . apply the law impartially and we trust that 
they will live up to this promise.”72
Even the majority was unwilling to be specific about what should 
be the basis for mandated recusal or disqualification.
 
73
 
 65. Id. at 778-79. 
  The Court would 
not claim that even campaign contributions by a litigant or attorney 
would create a probability of bias or serve as a basis for mandated 
 66. See id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We should not, even by inadvertence, ‘impute 
to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor,’”  citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 
(1941)). 
 67. Id. at 782. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 794 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 70. See Belmas & Shepard, supra note 28, at 732-33. 
 71. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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recusal. The facts in Caperton indicate that “this is an exceptional 
case.”74  The facts are “extreme by any measure.”75  States have adopted 
objective standards of judicial conduct as to the appearance of 
impropriety and disqualification when there is an issue of impartiality.76
In other words, even for the majority, decisions on recusal and 
disqualification are to be made by the judges themselves and only in the 
extreme case will there ever be a constitutional review of a judge who 
does not recuse or who is not disqualified by fellow jurists.
 
77
Under the rules of court of most jurisdictions, an application to recuse 
is heard, at least in the first instance, by the targeted judge.  A recusal 
motion’s usefulness is limited because a party may be reluctant to 
suggest to the judge of the party’s case that the judge has an ethical 
problem—such a suggestion may generate retaliation [and even then 
recusal]. . . . is available only in situations where the personnel is 
fungible—where an adequate and qualified substitute is readily 
available. . . . [Because] the targeted judge must judge herself[,] [t]he 
judge thus has a conflict of interest in deciding . . . [and] alternatives, 
especially in a court of last resort, are similarly flawed, assuming a 
 There are 
inherent problems with recusal or disqualification procedures.  As 
described by Professor Gerald J. Clark:  
 
 74. Id. at 2263. 
 75. Id. at 2265. 
 76. Id. at 2266-67 (“Almost every state . . . has adopted the American Bar Association’s 
objective standard: A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. . . . The 
ABA’s Model Code’s test for appearance of impropriety is ‘whether the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.’”). 
 77. In a situation not involving campaign contributions, but acceptance of gifts by the Chief 
Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the New York Times opined: 
[Under the policies set by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court], all state judges . . . can 
accept any gifts if they disclose them. . . . It permits violations of the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, by casting doubt on judges’ “capacity to 
act impartially.” . . . In his 17 years on the court, [Chief Justice Castille] stated, “no party 
has sought recusal on the basis of my financial disclosures. . . . [However, the rule 
against accepting gifts] is to free a judge from having to worry about whether he or she is 
influenced, without realizing it.  Another is to assure citizens who depend on the court’s 
fairness that the judge can’t be influenced by anything but the essentials of a case. . . . 
There is a growing consensus—outside the court—that the justices should change how 
they handle recusal: requiring a justice to explain any decision to recuse or not, and 
having a group of justices review each recusal decision. 
Editorial, Untenable Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, Sunday Opinion, at WK7 
[hereinafter Untenable Judicial Ethics]. 
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reluctance of members of a court to make an accusatory finding against 
a colleague.78
It must be noted here that West Virginia’s recusal rules model and 
the rules in most of the other states where judges face election and the 
“insufficiency and impotence” of these rules indicate the flaws in self-
regulation.
 
79  And, in the remand in Caperton, the same result occurred 
in a decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court, which did not include 
the recused Justice Benjamin.80
VIII.  IS REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM POSSIBLE? 
 
The core principle of any system of justice is judicial independence.  
International and domestic principles of the rule of law, including 
the internationally respected model The Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct, require that judges be impartial.  To the same effect are the 
United Nations Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, noting 
that judges shall decide “impartially . . . without any improper 
influences, inducements . . . for any reason.”  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized “a litigant's due process right to a fair 
trial before an unbiased judge.”  The lack of bias is a “cardinal principle 
of justice” and an “indispensable feature of democracy.”81
Obviously, those interested in the independence of the judiciary 
should make every effort to reform the present system within 
constitutional limits.
 
82
 
 78. Gerald J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 
692-93 (2010). 
  But those “constitutional limits” are the “triple 
whammy”: (1) the First Amendment protection of the right of  judges 
and judicial candidates to give specific, explicit statements as to their 
positions on issues; (2) the First Amendment right of entities to support 
with unlimited resources, judicial candidates, and often without 
disclosure of the real source of this campaign support; and (3) finally, 
any application of restrictive rules are to be enforced by the involved 
 79. See James Sample, Court Reform enters the Post-Caperton Era , 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787, 
791 (2010) [hereinafter Court Reform]. 
 80. Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 690 S.E.2d 322, 328 (W. Va. 2009). 
 81. Norman L. Greene, How Great Is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into 
the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial 
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 883-85 
(2010). 
 82. For a description of many of these proposed reforms, see Sample, Court Reform, supra 
note 79, at 793-818; Sample et al., THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010, supra note 56, at 67-77. 
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judges themselves, or by the limited oversight that courts will exercise 
over their colleagues. 
This may mean that independence is not really possible in any 
elected judges system.  As noted by Justice Kennedy in New York State 
Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres: 
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct 
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for 
competition among interest groups and political parties, the persisting 
question is whether that process is consistent with the perception and 
the reality of judicial independence and judicial excellence.  The rule 
of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning 
judiciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments, 
and the absolute probity of its judges.  And it may seem difficult to 
reconcile these aspirations with elections.83
Some of the remedies that have been considered include public 
financing and mandatory spending limits, but both would be ineffectual 
because of the First Amendment free speech protections for independent 
expenditures by outside and often invisible groups.
 
84  Another remedy is 
stricter rules on judges to recuse themselves,85 and for judges, other than 
the challenged one, to handle disqualification motions.86  However, 
judges often run on political tickets, and an appointment can be seen as a 
reward for long-term political service and so elected legislators are 
reluctant to depoliticize the judicial selection process.87  Moreover, 
judges are reluctant to set limits on themselves and their colleagues,88 
and even if rules are established, they are often vague and judges are 
reluctant to forcefully apply them.89
. . . even conflict in which a statute is explicitly struck down.”
  And if legislatures seek to adopt 
recusal and disqualification rules, this can lead to “inter-branch conflict  
90
 
 83. 552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
 84. See Jost, supra note 47 at 378. 
 85. See Untenable Judicial Ethics, supra note 77; Sample, Court Reform supra note 79, at 
818; Belmas & Shepard, supra note 28 at 732-36 (suggesting standards for recusal). 
 86. Clark, supra note 78 at 699 (citing ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 
Report to the House of Delegates (2009)). 
 87. See Greene, supra note 81 at 905. 
 88. See id. at 904. 
 89. See Jost, supra note 45 at 379. 
 90. William Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court from Itself”?:  Recusal, 
Separation of Powers and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 783 (2010). 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
The bottom line is that electing judges is “incompatible with the 
ideal of an independent judiciary.”91
The job of judging is fundamentally incompatible with political 
elections.  Judges are expected to make difficult and unpopular decisions 
based on the law and the facts of each case, whereas elected officials in 
the political branches are expected to be responsive to constituencies in 
order to be re-elected.
 
92
Judicial elections call into question the impartiality and fairness of 
even the most upstanding judges.  When litigants and attorneys with 
major economic or ideological interests fund judicial campaigns, the 
perception (if not the actuality) of improper influence leads people to 
believe that justice is for sale.  Public opinion surveys over the past 
decade-plus demonstrate this point.
 
93
Judicial elections do not provide meaningful voter participation or 
accountability to the electorate.  Most judges are initially appointed to 
fill a vacancy, and most sitting judges do not draw challengers.
 
94
So what is the alternative?  Many scholars and judicial luminaries 
favor a system where non-partisan commissions submit slates of judicial 
candidates to the governors.
 
95  This system is not perfect.  Judges or 
justices can still face pressure from outside influences96
 
 91. Clark, supra note 78 at 706.  Professor Clark continues:  “Judges concerned about their re-
election will not be independent.  The very reason for having elections is to tether the politician to 
the electorate, making for responsive legislators and executives.  Judges tethered to the electorate, 
on the other hand, will sacrifice justice and the rule of law to public opinion.”  Id.  As noted earlier, 
these ties are not now just to the voters but to those who fund electoral campaigns based on how 
they expect the judges to rule on specific issues. 
--but there is no 
 92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). See also Judges for Sale, supra note 65, at A12. 
 93. See Bert Brandenburg & Rachel Paine Caufield, Ardent Advocates, 93 Judicature 79 
(2009) (reviewing Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
(2009)). 
 94. See Ted A. Schmidt, Fair Courts Under Fire: Part I: Merit Selection of Judges; Under 
Attack without Merit, 42 ARIZ. ATTY. 13, 18 (2006); Charles Gardner Geyh, Perspectives on 
Judicial Independence: Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 53 (2003); Scott 
Williams Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the Judicial Selection Process in Alabama, 
52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (2003); John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 855-56 (1990).  
 95. James J. Sample, Charles Hall & Linda Casey, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS, 94 Judicature 50, 57 (2010) [hereinafter THE NEW POLITICS 2010].  See e.g. Letter from 
Sandra Day O’Connor in THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010, supra note 56, at i; Too Many States, 
supra note 34, at 8A. 
 96. See generally Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial 
Disqualification Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751 (2010). 
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direct link of opinions, money, and support.  It seems infinitely 
preferable to the “triple whammies” of judicial election. 
